Terror EK via Malvertising drops Smoke Loader


My last source of Terror appeared to dry up and other security researchers such as @jeromesegura have reported changes in Terror EK. I initially looked at the referrers provided in the article and saw the same patterns. 

However today I found a fresh Terror EK from malvertising and it appears to be “complete” in the sense that it now includes 4 Flash exploits (one of which had not been uploaded to VT for 5 months) and Silverlight exploit was not hosted on another domain. The only thing Terror EK has not done is a proper obfuscation of its code but I guess these are well known exploits and there is no requirement.

Overall it is clear Terror EK is in development by whomever controls it now. This version appears to look more like a main stream EK. All it needs is some strong obfuscation to slow down researchers especially if a new exploit is discovered.

Background Information:

  • An article on Terror exploit kit showing changes in the patterns:


  • Some Exploits used by this version of Terror EK:




Downloads (in password protected zip)

Notable Details:

  • Payload was zoskoezb.exe-> VirusTotal (4cd37ab66af60b7a709c3b17fb3692ae784b3897e442f7bff4a9374ea5719110)
  • I had left Smoke Loader running creating a mess of a PCAP so here is the Hybrid Analysis Report – Here

 Malvertising Chain

latency.ttrraacckkrr.com/pst/56da2f8ee4e7d000_1492110949267 ref.ppcmate.com/log?key=pop-up-6a32b466-a80b-4820-bd60-e17cddc1bf9caction=clickstrategy=75552pub=36148ts=1492110949269 vicals.pw/Xqhy3c

Terror EK – (

Details of infection chain:

(click to enlarge!)


Terror EK using 4 Flash Exploits and Silverlight as well as the usual IE exploits drops Smoke Loader.

For comparison here was my last Terror EK detection:


Terror EK delivers K.I.N.S

  • Post infection was Smoke Loader. It downloaded a variety of malwares but I have not included this in the PCAP. The samples however I have uploaded here.


    Aftermath of Smoke Loader infection.

Full Details:

  • The chain starts with malvertising. It appears odd in that the referrer on the landing page shows it to be the “latency” website. However clearly on “vicals.pw” you can see the 302 redirect to the landing page.PWPW2
  • The landing page contains a single iframe that loads multiple Flash exploits and a Silverlight. This has changed from multiple iframes. After this comes the usual landing page exploits. Nothing appeared to be obfuscated beyond some URL encoding. At the end of the script is a call to the payload.iframepayloadcall
  • The iframe from the landing page redirects to a page that contains 4 Flash exploits and one Silverlight. One of the Flash exploits had not been uploaded to VT in 5 months. CalltoFlash.PNG
  • Payload is dropped. This time without mentioning which CVE it had exploited.payload

Here are the VirusTotal reports note  9AJ1ib4oMs7f.swf is the “newer” Flash exploit:

SHA256: 4cd37ab66af60b7a709c3b17fb3692ae784b3897e442f7bff4a9374ea5719110
File name: zoskoezb.exe.bin
Detection ratio: 23 / 62
SHA256: 88cdbf79aba30f553a949fc281baaa5d2e5f887d6c3f05b617c4712a709d47a9
File name: Nr3aa05aWzAG.xap
Detection ratio: 40 / 58
SHA256: 4888cc96a390e2970015c9c1d0206011a6fd8e452063863e5e054b3776deae02
File name: IWVvF0eNPyto.swf
Detection ratio: 31 / 56
SHA256: 890f8756e6ab3bd62a2c3fbd098471e17db56808b19018119c0ad4a26ed7060f
File name: GvySSRjYjNW5.swf
Detection ratio: 17 / 56
SHA256: 97f107853c99b0de95a3e5b84ad1435e31cb42bd05d495d585e18f81a59a362d
File name: Ag3jtQf2n1nt.swf
Detection ratio: 18 / 55
SHA256: ce3c0da64772f3beaf7c0f25a85459d7b82e199eddb56f737c823b2dc51f310d
File name: 9AJ1ib4oMs7f.swf
Detection ratio: 33 / 56

One thought on “Terror EK via Malvertising drops Smoke Loader

  1. Pingback: Finding a Good Man: Part 2 – MALWARE BREAKDOWN

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